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BOOK REVIEWS
THE JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER LECTURES-1953-1956. Lexington, Virginia:
School of Law, Washington and Lee University, 1957. Pp. 208.
This little volume published this spring by the Washington and Lee
School of Law is the second of a distinguished series of books that
may inspire generations of practicing lawyers and of students aspiring
to practice law. On the Bi-Centennial of the University in 1949, which
was the One Hundredth Anniversary of the founding of its School of
Law, the Trustees of the University established an annual series of
lectures to the students of the Law School, in memory of its long-time
Dean. The roster of those chosen to deliver these lectures attests to
the lasting imprint that the series are making upon those fortunate
enough to hear the lectures as presented in Lexington. During the
first four years, 1949-1952, the lectures as published in the first volume
of the series were presented by
Honorable John W. Davis, 1949
Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt, 1950
Chief Judge John J. Parker, 1951
Honorable John Lord O'Brian, 1952
The volume containing the complete series of lectures for these four
years was, of course, a treasure house.
This is no less true as to the new second volume, presenting the
lectures
of 1953, by Chief Justice Joseph C. Hutcheson, entitled "Law and
Liberty Reconciled."
of 1954, by Judge Harold R. Medina, on "The Spiritual Quality of
Justice."
of 1955, by Dean Robert G. Storey, on "The Current Peril of the
Legal Profession."
of 1956, by Honorable William T. Gossett, on "Corporate Citizen-
ship."
At about the time of the presentation of the three lectures last year
by the General Counsel of Ford Motor Company, that lecturer ac-
cepted appointment on a new committee of the Section of Corpo-
ration, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association.
This was a committee on Corporate Law Departments which was ex-
pected to correlate the problems of corporation counsel and promote
their aiding one another in the solution of such problems. It is a tribute
to the quality of these three 1956 lectures that currently, following an
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impressive institute conducted jointly by that new committee of ABA
and a Division of the City Bar of New York, a copy of these three
Tucker lectures is being distributed (along with papers presented at
that institute) to those actively devoting their professional careers
as corporation counsel. No lawyer can fail to benefit from meditating
on the challenging analyses of Mr. Gossett on the multiple functions of
corporation counsel, functions that are judicial in nature, functions
that are comparable to legislative, those that are experiential and
those that should be attuned to the direction of public affairs, a func-
tion of highest political order. For whether one serves as counsel of
a corporation of national stature or as counsel for the utility company
of a county seat town in Texas, such functions are to be his, though
less dramatic in the latter case. Moreover, Mr. Gossett has persuaded
me that such functions are or should be also those of the lawyer with
numerous corporate clients, though his functions as to many or all
of them may be miniature in comparison. Accordingly, the idealism
and the common sense with which these functions of the legal advisor
to business are presented in these lectures, justifies their broader dis-
tribution than only to corporate counsel. They are in substance the
"current Bible" for the corporate practitioner.
No less Biblical in their lasting and inspiring qualities and no less
current in their present importance are the lectures of the three
earlier years that are presented in this volume.
Dean Storey presents the contrast between the Rule of Law in
democratic nations and its antithesis in the philosophy and background
of Communism. As I read these 1955 lectures, I found it necessary to
remind myself constantly that they were presented two years ago,
in advance of the definition of the Rule of Law in the summer of 1955,
by the joint action of the distinguished jurists of forty-eight nations
of the free world then assembled in Athens. With inexorable logic,
these lectures demonstrate that a legal profession in the administration
or enforcement of Soviet law must be, and historically has been,
"a travesty and a mockery." For those of us who are currently read-
ing summaries of the "trials" in Hungary which have followed the
tragedies of the ruthless suppression of "revolt" last fall, it seems
yet more clear as we read these lectures by Dean Storey, that contin-
uing flagrant injustice must continue to be an integral and necessary
part of the regime of repression which is Communism in power.
The theme of Judge Medina in his three lectures is of fundamental
importance. His lectures have a timeless quality that makes one want
to reread his words and then to live them. His theme of 1954 has to
do with the spiritual ideals of justice, the devastating quality of in-
justice, and how dynamic and pervasive the spiritual is in the ob-
jectives of legal procedures. Judge Medina demands of each of us a
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rededication to the principles, and, therefore, the procedures, neces-
sary to the attainment of justice, emphasizing the essential unity of
all things of the spirit and identifying justice with good will and
freedom and all that is fundamental in American democracy.
All of this brings me in this inverse order to a reference to the
three lectures by Judge Hutcheson in 1953. Througha brilliant ar-
ray of fundamentals in legal idealism, Judge Hutcheson brings to us
the central theme of the faith of our founding fathers. I have con-
cluded that if the lectures of these four years were read in reverse
order, as I am now reporting them, they become more clearly a united
whole. With all the other lectures treated as a prelude to the philo-
sophic analyses of our constitutional system, the lectures of Judge
Hutcheson become a fitting and conclusive climax. Quoting liberally
from the philosophers whose ideas most influenced the founders of
our nation, Judge Hutcheson demonstrates in words that cannot be
forgotten: "that law, to be law, must be something more than the un-
controlled, the unjust will of the majority of the people or of those
whom the majority had entrusted with state powers" (page 39); "that
you must first enable the government to control the government; and
in the next place, oblige it to control itself" (page 45); "the govern-
ment must be so constituted as that the laws will assure and secure
the maximum of liberty; to have the maximum of liberty laws must
be liberator as well as ruler, and at once the will and consent of the
whole people whose lives they direct" (page 60); and finally: "I
am therefore persuaded that if, as time goes on, justice, broadening
and deepening with the. stream of our national life, continues to
be with us an aspiration and not a mere policy, those who in the
long march of years come after us will be heard to declare: 'Though
these planted and those watered, surely it is God that hath given the
increase.'" (page 72).
To read these words of ultimate value to young men embarking on
a career in our profession by four such inspiring leaders, is truly
a memorable experience.
PAUL CAERINGTON
DESEGREGATION Amn TH LAW, By Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence
Clyde Ferguson, Jr., New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1957. Pp. xiv, 332.
Genuine disagreement exists throughout the country as to the wis-
dom and ultimate effect of The School Segregation Cases' decided in
* Member, National Advisory Council of The Practicing Law Institute;
member, Carrington, Gowan, Johnson, Bromberg & Leeds, Dallas, Texas.
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemental opinion,
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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1954 and 1955 by the United States Supreme Court. Some persons
are disappointed that the enforcement provisions are not more positive
and direct. Others feel that desegregation is moving along too rapidly.
Still others contend that in jeopardy are important values, such as the
right of Congress rather than the judiciary to decide policy questions,
and the right to local government. More over, many persons who have
not taken a position are nevertheless concerned or disturbed about
the lack of national harmony in racial matters.
Realizing the consternation that surrounds this important public
question, Professors Blaustein and Ferguson have written a book that
in nontechnical language explains the law relevant to the issue. They
believe that a clear expository treatment will lead to an understanding
of and respect for the law and will help to abate those irrational and
emotional responses that segregation as a topic so frequently evokes
from all sides. The authors, thus, have committed themselves to the
high task of unbiased teaching, and, in my opinion, they have suc-
ceeded in their endeavor.
One of the chief values of the book is its journalistic rather than
legalistic style. At the same time, the book displays sound scholarship.
This treatment permits the authors to reach both legal and lay audi-
ences without sacrificing accuracy. In order to satisfy the technically
minded, the writers have carefully documented their statements.
Their footnotes cite such diverse sources as Time, Life, Newsweek, and
Ebony; Blackstone, Bryce, and Alexis de Toqueville; scores of statutes,
books, and articles; and over two hundred cases. Of especial interest
to the Vanderbilt community is the wide use these scholars make of
the Race Relations Law Reporter.
The book is also excellent in content. It analyzes the pertinent legal
materials from Dred Scott 2 through the School Segregation Cases3 as
well as the more recent decisions. Especially interesting are the dis-
cussion of the fourteenth amendment, Plessy v. Ferguson,4 and Sweatt
v. Painter.5
In the development of the thought that the Supreme Court is
composed of nine men who do and should make law, though not in
terms of personal predilections, the authors place before their readers
a clear statement of a frequently misunderstood position. These writ-
ers also explain the relationship of law to sociology. They demonstrate
that, in principle, sociological facts are as relevant to the decision-
making process as are economic data, even though persons may
reasonably disagree as to the credibility of any particular fact.
2. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
3. See note I supra.
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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Less fortunate is the bifurcation the book makes of the Court, and
by implication of the readers, into "liberals" and "conservatives."
Persons of diverse political and economic persuasions have assisted
Negro citizens in their efforts to obtain fuller opportunities to the ad-
vantages of American life. These same persons may well disagree on
other questions. The movement to eliminate racial discrimination
needs no larger doctrinal framework.
Other minor objections would include the ethnical placing of Clinton,
Tennessee, in the Old South. (p. 213). The authors made this state-
ment to illustrate the progress of integration in a community sharing
traditional Southern mores. Since their book went to press, they have
a better case in point: Greensboro, North Carolina, is integrating
peacefully. Nor can I agree with these authors in commending
Beauharnais v. Illinois,6 which upheld the constitutionality of a group-
libel statute despite its limitations on free speech. Evident also is an
occasional tendency to refer to The South, The North, and The Negro
rather than to some Southerners, some Northerners, and some Negroes.
Such matters are minor. What counts is the comprehensive treat-
ment of this plaguing subject and the clarity and usefulness of the
presentation. All who are either bored by technical discussions or
else irritated by mere editorials will welcome this book, which con-
tains the essential information, and much more, all under one cover.
The book also should be of especial value to persons who wish to
clarify their thinking in terms of individual responsibility. For al-
though the Justices have decreed that segregation is illegal, genuine
integration can be realized only through the mutual acceptance of
persons, one of the other. Since this is the problem that remains,
we do not have to answer the question as put by Sartre: "Which does
the greater good, the vague act of fighting in a group, or the con-
crete one of helping a particular human being to go on living? ' 7 Pro-
fessors Blaustein and Ferguson relate what the group has accom-
plished. They set out the law as they see it together with the richness
of its development. They state that they approve of integration. They
provide insight. They do not, however, attempt to force their opinions
or to project their wills onto others. They leave the reader to his own
choices. In so doing, they demonstrate not only scholarship but wis-
dom, apparently being mindful of Talleyrand's injunction: Not too
much zeal.
J. ALLEN SmITH*
6. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
7. SARTRE, EXISTENTIALSM 30 (1947).
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University.
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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT. By William B. Wright. Foreword by
Emile Z. Berman. New York: Central Book Co., 1957. Pp. 246.
This book is an introduction to the Federal Tort Claims Act' written
with the purpose of acquainting "practicing" attorneys with the
general case law on provisions of that Act. The author is an attorney
in the Department of Labor. In the preparation of the book he states
that he sent questionnaires to over 300 attorneys throughout the
United States. All of these attorneys prosecuted claims on behalf of
plaintiffs under the Act. He does not seem to have addressed any
inquiry whatsoever about the Act to any one who had ever served the
defendant under the Act.
The book should be useful to those who know nothing at all about
the Act and would like to get a general idea of how the Act operates.2
For anyone concerned with more than a simple rear end collision
the book may well serve as an ambush because it gives no indication
that there are many thorny and unresolved legal problems that arise
out of the administration of the Act.
As befits a professional work, an objective tone is maintained
throughout most of the book but on a few points Mr. Wright does show
passion. First, and to him the most important of all, is the fact that
in the experience of his friends with the Act for over ten years there
is only one matter that has come up under the Act that appears to
be in need of legislation. This is the section limiting attorneys to
twenty per cent of the recovery. [28 U.S.C. section 2678 (1952) ]. There
is a whole chapter devoted to, what is to him, a wretched, inexcusable,
and unconstitutional clause.
The other point that arouses Mr. Wright's strongest feelings is the
fear that awards may not be "adequate". But he is proud to say
that "there are able and impartial judges who fearlessly award sub-
stantial damages when serious injuries are brought before them." (P.
73).
The book has a series of appendices that might be helpful. The
text of the Act is set forth in one of them. The second appendix is
a list of awards and settlements under the Federal Tort Claims Act
set up in a format which, surprisingly enough, is very similar to that
used by the NACCA Law Journal. And finally there is a very useful
appendix giving the text of various types of pleadings that have been
used in the past in cases involving the Tort Act.
So far as it goes there can be no complaints. The book shows the
great range of tort cases that can arise out of the manifold activities
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1952).
2. Such readers might also study, with possibly more profit, Heuser,
Dalehite v. United States; a New Approach to the Federal Tort Claims Act?,
7 VA-=. L. REv. 175 (1954).
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of our government today and it shows how suits may be brought to
secure compensation for such injuries. Nevertheless, I feel that some-
thing more not only could have been done but should have been done.
There is more to this law than the decided cases. The vast majority
of the cases under the Act do not get reported. One should have
some knowledge of this tremendous experience.
Mr. Wright is sparing of advice and seldom suggests dangerous turns
in operating under the Act. There are exceptions to this observation.
For instance at one point he says:
A further reason, and not by any means the least, why it may sometimes
be preferable to sue the employee rather than the government, is that in
a questionable claim the government, with its great staff of attorneys,
will contest the matter to the bitter end, taking the case at least to the
Circuit Court of Appeals and often to the Supreme Court. (P. 78).
It cannot be said with certainty that the Government will fight any
particular case to the bitter end. Appellate policies within the De-
partment are based on innumerable factors, but any attorney would,
of course, be well advised to consider what to do about a questionable
claim rather than fritter away his twenty per cent in arguing such
a case through the courts.
The author has slighted one very important point that comes up in
the administration of the Act. In this whole book of 148 pages of text,
1V2 piges are devoted to the settlement of claims. This, of course,
shows a serious lack of proportion because the settlement procedures
are the heart of the Act. Before we discuss this point further let me
give you a few facts that will prepare the way for a technique of
saving attorneys time, energy, money and possibly make it worth their
while to take those Tort Act cases which Mr. Wright claims are being
turned down in so many cases because the attorneys cannot afford to
spend their time on a mere twenty per cent of the awards.
On January 1, 1956, there were 1829 suits being defended by the
United States under the Tort Act. The claims asserted in the com-
plaints if "these suits amounted to $273,000,000. During the year
1956, 935 of these suits were terminated. The original claims in
these terminated suits amounted to $43,436,000. Of the number so
terminated 413 were ended by compromise settlement. These 413
suits were finally settled 'by the Government for a total of $1,826,000.
The 'original- claims in these suits had amounted to $15,871,000. An
additional 158 of these cases went to trial and judgment was found
against the United States. The judgments in these 158 cases amounted
'to $1,491,000. The originalclaims in these 158 cases had been $7,208,000.
The remaining 364 cases terminated in the year 1956 must be regarded
as victories for the government since they were terminated at no cost
to the government. Such termination would include, of course, actual
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wins in litigation by way of trial or preliminary motion, voluntary
withdrawals, and all the other many reasons for which cases would
be withdrawn from the courts.3 As may be seen, plaintiffs success-
fully tried only 158 out of 935 cases.
In short, $43,000,000 worth of claims were disposed of for $3,300,000.
These figures indicate that if there is to be a recovery the settlement
process is probably the easiest way to get it. If a lawyer has a good
claim against the United States, and presumably he is equipped to
recognize such a claim, he should file suit under the Act in order to
get such claim considered. By way of caveat, a settlement does not
imply an admission of liability. In order to secure serious considera-
tion of his claim the attorney should submit an offer along with
proof that the offer is a reasonable one. From both judgments and
settlements discussed above it is clear that the claims usually made
in the complaints bear little relation to a just settlement of the cases.
Unless the offer of settlement is in reasonable alignment with the
ultimate settlements as suggested by these figures, an offer to settle
is likely to receive no successful consideration. An offer to settle with-
out any proof of the actual losses sustained likewise will receive no
favorable consideration and when that moment comes the only alterna-
tive is to go to trial with the "you-know-what" effect on the twenty
per cent.
In a book so completely devoted to the interest of the plaintiff the
author could well have been more helpful to such plaintiff by dis-
cussing some of the pitfalls that are run into by a very great many
plaintiffs. Such discussion could have been devoted to some of the
legal problems that arise under the Act. The importance of appro-
priate settlement efforts was emphasized above. Considerable space in
the book should have been devoted to discovery proceedings that
are a peculiar problem under this Act. For instance, how can a
plaintiff prove that an exploding jet plane, now completely dis-
integrated, was being operated in a negligent manner at the time of
the accident? Another problem that the author should have dis-
cussed is the problem of contribution and indemnity under this Act. An
understanding of this problem would give any plaintiff a more
flexible attitude towards the possible defendants in his cause of
action. Because none of these problems have been discussed this
book must be supplemented with additional material before a plain-
3. These figures are approximate. They are taken from the docket records
in the Justice Department and it must be remembered that they include only
claims in which a complaint has been filed in a district court. They do not
include any reference to the thousands of administrative claims that are
either paid or rejected each year by the various agencies of the United
States Government. These figures also include cases where the plaintiff has
sued the employee rather than the government. Such employee is usually
defended by the United States Attorney.
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